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Abstract
In models with a representative inﬁnitely lived household, modern versions of tax
smoothing imply that the steady-state of government debt should follow a random
walk. This is unlikely to be the case in OLG economies, where, the equilibrium
interest rate may diﬀer from the policy-maker’s rate of time preference such that
it may be optimal to reduce debt today to reduce distortionary taxation in the
future. Moreover, the level of the capital stock (and therefore output and, possibly,
consumption) in these economies is likely to be sub-optimally low, and reducing
government debt will ‘crowd in’ additional capital. Using an elaborate version of
the model of perpetual youth developed by Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965),
we derive the optimal steady state level of government assets. We show how and
why this level of government assets falls short of the level of debt that achieves the
optimal capital stock and the level that eliminates income taxes.
JEL Codes: E21, E32, E63
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1 Introduction
The problems caused by excessive levels of public debt do not need enumerating. As
governments around the world try to bring deﬁcits under control, and subsequently to
reduce levels of debt in relation to GDP, a natural question to ask is how far debt
levels should be reduced, and how quickly, once any immediate crisis resulting from
large default risk premia has diminished. In other words, what should be the ultimate
target for the debt to GDP ratio, and how quickly should we get there? Until now,
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1most analysis of this question has been undertaken using models in which consumers
in eﬀect live forever, by appropriately internalising the utility of their children. This
tends to have the implication that the optimal level of debt depends upon the initial
level of debt as policy makers seek to minimise the costs of distortionary taxation going
forwards (see Barro (1979) and Chamley (1985,1986) for example). The implications of
the benchmark result in such models is striking: once fears of default have receded, the
optimum level of debt is closely tied to the historic debt level. This martingale process
for debt has also re-emerged in New Keynesian style DSGE models, (see for example,
Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a)), where policy
makers also care about the costs of inﬂation in an sticky price environment as well as
minimising the costs of tax distortions. These applications of tax smoothing all suggest
that attempts to reduce the extent of distortionary taxation in the long run will require
short run increases in these taxes whose cost outweighs the eventual gain.
However, within this literature there have been attempts to analysis the optimal
quantity of debt by introducing additional costs or beneﬁts associated with the level of
government debt. For example, in Aiyagari et al (2002) implict risk premia in an econ-
omy with incomplete ﬁnancial markets may encourage the government to accumulate
suﬃcient assets to pay for (exogenously determined, but stochastic) government spend-
ing after eliminating distortionary taxation, although introducing ad hoc limits on the
levels of assets held by the government will ensure policy is more akin to that described
in the orginal tax smoothing result of Barro (1979). Aiyagari and McGratten (1998)
allow for a role for government debt in that it can help alleviate households’ borrowing
constraints, while Shin (2006) allows for household heterogeneity and idiosyncratic in-
come shocks to provide a role for government debt in facilitating precautionary saving.
However, with the exception of Aiyagari and McGratten (1998), where risk premia due
to incomplete ﬁnancial markets drive interest rates above the rate of time preference
in a production economy which utilises physical capital, these papers do not allow for
one of the common worries associated with rising debt levels, namely that public debt
crowds out private capital.
In overlapping generations economies where agents do not care about their children
(or do not care about them enough), this eﬀect is central to the desirability of stabilising
debt. There are, in fact, two reasons why the random walk steady state debt result no
longer holds in these Non-Ricardian economies. First, if the economy is not dynamically
ineﬃcient, then the real interest rate is likely to exceed the rate of time preference,
which means that from a Ramsey planner’s point of view it may be worth sacriﬁcing
some current utility in order to achieve a steady state where distortionary taxes are lower
than they currently are (even if the current generation may lose out as a result). Second,
as noted above, the level of the capital stock (and therefore output and consumption)
in these economies is likely to be sub-optimally low, and reducing government debt will
‘crowd in’ additional capital.
2This raises an immediate question: will the debt target in such models be the debt
level that eliminates the need for distortionary taxes, or will it be the level that achieves
the optimal capital stock? This is one of the issues we examine in this paper. Using an
elaborate version of the model of perpetual youth developed by Blanchard (1985) and
Yaari (1965), which allows us to vary the extent of Non-Ricardian behaviour parametri-
cally, we derive the optimal steady state level of government assets. We show how and
why this level of government assets falls short of both the level of debt that achieves
the optimal capital stock and the level that eliminates income taxes. We also explore
the non-linear path the policy maker follows in moving the economy from its current
position to the desired long-run solution to the Ramsey problem.
Section 2 contrasts, in a highly simpliﬁed way, the steady state random walk debt
result with the outcome when the rate of interest is above the rate of time preference,
and where capital is below its optimal level. Section 3 outlines a quite rich version of the
model of perpetual youth, which features sticky prices, exogenous growth, distortionary
taxation, government consumption and public and private physical capital accumulation.
In section 4, we discuss social welfare, the model’s calibration, and our numerical results
for both the steady-state of the Ramsey problem and the non-linear Ramsey dynamics.
A ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Optimal Debt and Optimal Capital
The benchmark model for optimal debt implies that there is no optimal level of debt.
This benchmark assumes that individuals are eﬀectively inﬁnitely lived, and ignores
the possibility of default. Taxation is distortionary, so if we could choose the level of
government debt we inherit, it would be negative, and the interest payments on these
government assets would pay for any government consumption. In the discussion below,
we call this the zero-tax level of government assets, or AT. Of course, without recourse
to default or some equivalent expropriation mechanism, a government cannot choose
the level of debt it inherits. (A Ramsey planner could in theory expropriate suﬃcient
capital using a capital tax, and then commit to setting capital taxes to zero, but this
commitment is unlikely to be credible.)
Suppose we inherit a level of debt diﬀerent from AT, the zero tax level of assets. In the
absence of any other means of reducing debt except higher taxes or lower spending, then
we have a choice between high taxes (or lower spending) now to reduce debt towards the
optimal level, or accepting permanently positive taxes (or lower than optimal government
spending) that will ﬁnance the interest payments on the inherited debt level, and so leave
debt unchanged. If the costs of distortionary taxes or lower than optimal public spending
are increasing at the margin, then we get a classic tax smoothing result, which is that
it is optimal to keep the inherited level of debt.
However implicit in this argument is that the real rate of interest is equal to the rate
3at which we discount the future. We can show this formally as follows. Suppose social






where T is the level of distortionary taxes and β is the discount factor. The budget
constraint is
At = (1 + r)At−1 + Tt − G (2)
where A are government assets. The government inherits a debt level B−1 > 0, such






t+i + 2λt+i(At+i − (1 + r)At+i−1 − Tt+i)] (3)
The ﬁrst order condition for taxes is
Tt+i − λt+i = 0 (4)
and for debt
λt+i − β(1 + r)λt+i+1 = 0 (5)
Combining gives
β(1 + r)Tt+i+1 − Tt+i = 0 (6)
If β(1 + r) = 1, then the FOC for debt implies the Lagrange multiplier is constant,
which in turn implies constant taxes. Taxes can only be constant if they are suﬃcient
to satisfy the budget constraint if A is constant at −B−1, which is the tax smoothing
or random walk steady state debt result. (See, for example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004a) and Benigno and Woodford (2003)). However, if β(1+r)  = 1, then a steady state
is possible only if taxes are zero. If β(1+r) < 1 debt will decline towards this value. In
this situation it is always better to reduce debt each year, because the discounted beneﬁts
of lower future taxes exceed the cost of higher taxes today. The cost of permanently
positive taxes will always outweigh the cost of reducing debt, because we discount at
less than the rate of interest, and so we head towards the zero tax level of government
assets. If β(1 + r) > 1 then debt will follow an explosive path. For an example of this,
see Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2007).
In this simple model, when β(1+r) = 1, the tax smoothing result is time consistent.
There is no reason to deviate from the inherited level of debt at any time. This result
will not be robust to two natural extentions of the model: introducing nominal debt, or
staying with real debt but allowing for sticky prices. If inﬂation is determined by a New
Keynesian Phillips Curve, then Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) show that there is a ﬁrst
4period incentive to reduce inherited debt somewhat (but not completely). However, this
incentive recurs as we move to the next period, and so the random walk result is not
just modiﬁed, but is also time inconsistent. They also show that the time consistent
policy involves a very rapid reduction in debt to its initial level following a positive
shock. (This is true for a closed economy, or simple open economy with a ﬂexible
exchange rate, but rates of adjustment are slower under EMU - see Leith and Wren-
Lewis (2010).) However, there are reasons for wanting to focus on the time inconsistent
case. In reality governments do not rapidly correct any debt disequilibrium. This may
be because the costs of doing so are not only high, but they are also short term, so an
impatient government would have an incentive to stick to the time inconsistent plan.
When it comes to thinking about the optimal capital stock, we have another bench-
mark result, which is that if consumers are eﬀectively inﬁnitely lived, then in the absence
of the taxation and other distortions, the level of the capital stock that would be cho-
sen by a social planner would be the same as that produced by a market equilibrium.
Because Ricardian Equivalence holds, any increase in government debt leads to a match-
ing increase in private saving, with no impact on this capital stock. In short, debt does
not crowd out capital. However, in an OLG economy, the economy will not in general
generate an optimal capital stock, and government debt will crowd out capital.
The assumption that individuals leave bequests because they internalise the utility
of the next generation (although with discounting), so that they are eﬀectively inﬁnitely
lived, is a useful benchmark, but it may be at the extreme end of plausible degrees of
inter-generational altruism. At the opposite extreme we have overlapping generation
(OLG) models, which generally assume completely selﬁsh generations that leave no
intentional bequests. In the model of Perpetual Youth developed by Blanchard and
Yaari, if income does not decline with age (and there is no retirement), the real rate
of interest will be above the rate of time preference, and so the level of the capital
stock is likely to be suboptimally low. In addition, higher government debt will crowd
out private capital in OLG models, because Ricardian Equivalence no longer holds.
Agents accumulate assets because it is optimal for them to do so as individuals, with
no thought for the utility of future generations. It is a model of this kind we develop
in the next section. Although the model we develop below is quite rich, the essence of
the implications for government debt for the real interest rate can be understood by
considering some key equations from a simpliﬁed version of the model. Ignoring the
households’ cash holdings and the tax on consumption, logarithmic utility implies that
the aggregate consumption function is a linear function of human and ﬁnancial wealth,




where c is consumption, lw is human wealth, W/P ﬁnancial assets, γ is the survival
probability and β is the households’ subjective discount factor. Human capital is given
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t )wtlt is post-tax labour income, OIt are other (exogenous) sources of income
detailed in the model section and Rt
πt+1 is the real interest rate. Agents hold portfolios
of ﬁnancial assets such that they eﬀectively receive an additional return 1/γ on their
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Rt = Kt, then this equation clearly implies that in steady state r > 1/β.
Individual agents are always saving, but the aggregate level of assets can be constant
because those who die have positive assets and the newborn have none. This is the
ﬁrst important implication of allowing for ﬁnite lives with no bequests: the real rate of
interest can diﬀer from the rate of time preference even in steady state. (The implications
of this point are discussed in Erosa and Gervais (2001).)
The second important diﬀerence an OLG model makes is that government debt can




Rt = Kt + Bt, where Bt is government debt as before. In
steady state, if consumption and real interest rates were unchanged, government debt
would crowd out private capital one for one. In fact consumption is likely to fall if capital
falls, increasing the extent of crowding out. However, a reduction in the capital stock
will also raise real interest rates, which for given consumption levels will raise the overall
level of aggregate assets, which moderates the degree of crowding out of capital. (In the
inﬁnite life case, which we approach as γ tends to one, any increase in government debt
leads to an equal increase in savings, so there is no crowding out.)
Just as government debt crowds out capital, if the government holds assets (B <
0), capital will be crowded in. If, when A = 0, capital is sub-optimally low, then
accumulating government assets can be used to move to the optimal level of capital.
We could deﬁne the level of government assets that achieve this optimum capital stock
as the ’optimum capital’ level of assets, or AK. Unless the economy with A = B = 0
is dynamically ineﬃcient1, such a move would not represent a Pareto improvement,
because the higher taxes that the government would require to accumulate assets would
hit the current generation. However, as any debt policy is almost certain to disadvantage
1In this model of perpetual youth, r > θ, so the economy is never dynamically ineﬃcient. However
introducing either government assets, or allowing income to decline with age, can allow the possibility
that r < θ, as we note below.
6some generation, this should not prevent us considering using debt as a means of moving
towards AK.
Deﬁning what is optimal in an OLG model of course involves deciding how to com-
pare diﬀerent generations. Since we are interested in formulating optimal policy for our
economy populated with overlapping generations of ﬁnitely lived consumers we must
face the tricky issue of constructing a welfare metric. We discuss the issues involved in
deﬁning a social welfare function below. However, we essentially follow Calvo and Ob-
stfeld (1988) by splitting the problem into an intratemporal problem of how to allocate
consumption across generations at a given point in time, and an intertemporal problem,
of how to stabilise debt over time. Since we are primarily interested in the latter aspect
of the problem, we abstract from the ﬁrst by assuming that the policy maker ignores
the intratemporal problem and only considers per capita variables when deﬁning social
welfare in an environment where government debt can crowd out private capital. In
doing so we assume that the policy maker discounts welfare between generations at the
same rate as household discount there own utility.
If the only implication of moving to an OLG framework was that there was some
optimal capital stock, then we could simply calculate AK, and this could become our
long run debt ‘target’. Indeed, if lump sum taxes were available, we could in theory
immediately move to AK: the additional tax payments would be exactly oﬀset by interest
payments on this debt. However, in the absence of lump sum taxes, any change in
government assets/debt will, by changing capital, also change the real interest rate.
This means that the level of government assets that would eliminate distortionary taxes
(AT) also becomes a potential ‘target’ for long run government debt.
In the case of the Ricardian model, the zero-tax level of assets AT was irrelevant
because of tax smoothing, as the real rate of interest was equal to the rate of time
preference. However in general this condition will not hold in an OLG model. We can
examine the implications of this for steady state debt in a highly oversimpliﬁed fashion











where A are government assets. Welfare fails to reach the ﬁrst-best allocation for two
reasons (which for simplicity we assume are separable): taxes are distortionary, but also
capital is away from its optimal level whenever government assets are diﬀerent from AK.
We still have the budget constraint
At = (1 + r)At−1 + Tt − G (12)
where we now allow the real interest rate to depend on government assets in the following
7simple way:
rt = r0 − γAt−1/2
which captures the idea that as government assets rise, the capital this crowds in reduces












+ 2λt+i (At+i − (1 + r0 − γAt+i−1/2)At+i−1 − Tt+i)
￿
(13)
The FOC for taxes is
Tt+i − λt+i = 0 (14)
and for debt
α(At+i − AK) + λt+i − β(1 + r0 − γAt+i)λt+i+1 = 0 (15)
Combining gives
β(1 + r0 − γ
￿
At+i − aK￿
− γAK)Tt+i+1 − Tt+i = α(At+i − AK) (16)
which can be rewritten as
β(1 + ˜ r)Tt+i+1 − Tt+i = (α + βγTt+i+1)(At+i − AK) (17)
where 1 + ˜ r = 1 + r0 + γBK.
Consider the case where β(1+ ˜ r) = 1 ﬁrst. Whatever the level of steady state taxes,
government assets will end up at the level that achieves the optimal capital stock i.e.
A∗ = AK where A∗is the steady state level of assets (and B∗ = −A∗ the steady-state
level of debt). Taxes will be given by
T∗ = G + rB∗
We can think of this in the following way. The case where β(1 + ˜ r) = 1 is akin to
tax smoothing, so A∗ is not attracted to AT. However, we do not get a random walk
in steady state debt, because reducing debt has the beneﬁt of increasing capital and
therefore output.
If β(1 + ˜ r) > 1, we already know that tax smoothing does not apply, and there will
be some history-independent debt target. There are two possibilities. First, taxes are
8positive in steady state, and so steady state government assets exceed the level required
to obtain the optimal capital stock. We therefore have AT > A∗ > AK. Second, taxes
become negative in steady state, but despite this government assets are insuﬃcient to
achieve the optimal capital stock (providing α + βγTt+i+1 > 0). In this second case, it
must be that AK > A∗ > AT. In both cases, we can think about optimal government
assets as being a compromise between the zero-tax level and the optimal capital level.
The former matters, because tax smoothing does not apply.
Is β(1 + ˜ r) < 1 interesting? If the term multiplying the deviation of debt from the
optimal capital level happened to be zero it would not be, because there would be no
incentive to stabilise debt. However, as we have seen with the case of β(1 + ˜ r) = 1, the
additional incentive to move debt towards the level that maximises the capital stock
means that government assets can converge to this level. So providing β(1 + ˜ r) is not
too far below one, a steady state is still possible. If it does exist, then if taxes are
positive we will have A∗ < AK and A∗ < AT. The reason is that if debt reached the
optimal capital level, then there would be a tendency for debt to explode. The economy
therefore stabilises when this incentive is exactly oﬀset by the incentive to get capital
a little higher. Another possibility is that A∗ > AK and taxes are negative, implying
AT < AK < A∗.
To sum up, in an OLG model the ‘target’ or ‘steady state optimal’ level of government
assets A∗ will depend on both the level of assets that delivers the optimum capital stock
(AK) and the level of assets that eliminate distortionary taxes (AT) in ways that are
likely to depend on the detailed structure and parameterisation of the model. If A∗ is
associated with a real interest rate below the rate of time preference, then it may be the
case that A∗ will not lie in between AT and AK. The next section sets out the model
we will investigate, where we ﬁnd this is indeed the case.2
3 The Complete Model
In this section we outline our model. Our economy is populated by overlapping gener-
ations of consumers who face a constant probability of death, such that, even if taxes
were lump-sum, Ricardian Equivalence would not hold in our model.3 These consumers
supply labour to imperfectly competitive ﬁrms, who combine this labour with capital
rented from a representative capital rental ﬁrm and public capital accumulated by the
government, to produce a diﬀerentiated product. The ﬁrms producing these diﬀerenti-
ated products are also subject to the constraints implied by Rotemberg (1982) quadratic
adjustment costs. Consumers’ labour income is taxed, and they hold ﬁnancial wealth in
the form of money, bonds and equities, as well as life-insurance contracts.
2However, equation (10) will hold, so whether A
∗ <> K in steady state will be directly related to
whether the real rate of interest at the optimal level of debt will be greater or less than the rate of time
preference (after adjusting for growth eﬀects).
3For recent analysis that investigates further the short term role that ﬁscal policy can play in this
class of model, see Devereau (2010).
93.1 Consumers’ Behaviour
Here we introduce the main departure from the canonical New-Keynesian model. While
there is abundant evidence of a strong interaction among ﬁscal impulses and output (see,
for example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Fatas and Mihov (1998), standard dynamic
general equilibrium models downplay the role of demand. The importance of the demand
side of the economy is partially restored when there is slow adjustment in nominal and
real variables, but still intertemporal substitution mechanisms and Ricardian equivalence
leave consumption largely unresponsive to a temporary ﬁscal stimulus. Introducing a
probability of death implies that consumers discount their future disposable income
more heavily, such that the usual Ricardian experiment of a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced lump-sum
tax cut now increases consumption.
Households face a constant probability of death (1 − γ). As this is a constant ex-
ogenous probability, and there is a continuum of households, they imply there is no
aggregate uncertainty in our economy. This implies that a consumer born at time i,













and holding real money balances, Mi
t/Pt, and suﬀers disutility from supplying labour to
imperfectly competitive ﬁrms, li
















By reducing the household’s discount factor by the survival probability γ we are implic-
itly conditioning on the survival of this particular household (otherwise there would be
double-counting of the probability of death).
Due to the diﬃculties in conceptualising complete ﬁnancial contracts amongst mar-
kets participants some of whom are as yet unborn, we assume that ﬁnancial markets
are incomplete, but in an economy without aggregate uncertainty. Accordingly, we as-
sume that households can hold risk-free nominal one period government bonds which
pay a gross interest rate of Rt regardless of the state of nature (including the survival
of the bond holder), and non-interest bearing money. Households also buy shares, V i
t in
capital rental ﬁrms for a real price qv
t which pay out their net cash ﬂows as dividends,
dt. They can also enter into survival-contingent contracts with other households, which
pay an agreed sum to other households in the event of the individual’s death, but enti-
tle the individual to similar payments from deceased households should the individual
survive. The individual will construct a portfolio of money, bonds, equities and survival-
contingent contracts such that the payoﬀ from that portfolio should the individual die
is zero. However, if household i is lucky enough to survive their combined return from
10risk-free bonds, equities and survival-contingent contracts written against those bonds





γ , respectively, while the return to hold-
ing money is Mi
t−1/γ. This is simply an alternative means of capturing the insurance
contracts usually undertaken within the Blanchard-Yaari set-up.
Consumers seek to maximise utility subject to the demand schedule for their labour


























Here consumers earn after-tax income from their labour services Pt(1 − τw
t )wtli
t, and
receive their share of the proﬁts of ﬁnal goods producers, (1 − γ)Pt
￿ 1
0  jtdj, as well as





























as the non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial income of generation i households in period t. Then,













t represents the payoﬀ from the household’s portfolio in all states of nature, but
conditional on the household surviving, and Qt,t+1 = γR−1
t is the price of receiving one
unit of that payoﬀ. Note that should the household not survive, the payoﬀ from the
portfolio is zero, such that the expected payoﬀ from one unit of the portfolio across all
states of nature, including the survival/non-survival of the household, is the risk free
rate of interest Rt.




























a labour supply condition,
(1 − τw
t )wt(1 − li
t) = κci
t, (27)






t+1 + dt+1). (28)
Using the household budget constraint, together with the money-demand equation,
























where the household discounts future labour and proﬁt income more heavily than its
straight rate of time preference, as it will not receive that income should it die, but
expectations are taken over all states of nature, other than the survival/non-survival of













t represents the generation i′s human wealth, given as the discounted value of























3.2 Aggregating across Consumers and Consumption Dynamics.
If the size of each cohort when born is 1, then the size of a cohort i at time t is given







4Note that this implies that an inﬁnitesimally small number of consumers will live-forever. This is
why this means of introducing non-Ricardian behaviour is sometimes called the ‘perpetual youth model’.
12Aggregate variables are deﬁned as, xt =
￿t
i=−∞ γt−ixi















It is similarly possible to aggregate across consumers from diﬀerent generations to gen-










and aggregate human wealth is given by,














It should be noted that the aggregate of ﬁnancial wealth, Wt = Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 +
Pt(qv
t + dt)Vt−1, takes account of the fact that not all households will have survived
from last period into the current one, implying that the households’ aggregate budget
constraint is given by,
Mt + Bt + PtqtDt + Ptqv
tVt + Ptct = Pt(1 − τw
t )wtlt + Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1
+Pt(qv




3.3 The Capital Rental Firm’s Behaviour
We assume that there is a single representative ﬁrm accumulating private capital for
rental to the ﬁnal goods ﬁrms. This ﬁrm seeks to maximise the discounted value of
its cashﬂows. This objective function is consistent with maximising the value of the
households’ equity. Therefore the ﬁrm’s objective function is to maximise the following
expression,
Pt(qv
t + dt)Vt−1 = pk


















t is the real rental cost of capital, kt is the capital stock, et is real investment
expenditure, and τk
t is the rate of taxation on the income from renting capital. The
13equation of motion of the capital stock is then given by,
kt+1 = et + (1 − δ)kt. (38)
The ﬁrst order condition for investment is given by,
λk
t = 1 (39)
where λk
t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the equation of motion for the capital
stock. Given the homogeneity of our proﬁt function, this is equivalent to Tobin’s q so
that in the absence of capital adjustment costs, Tobin’s q is one. Also, diﬀerentiating






t+1 + 1 − δ
￿
(40)
The capital accumulated by this sector is then rented out to the imperfectly competitive
ﬁrms producing ﬁnal goods for consumers, as described below.
This marginal q can be related to average q (and therefore the value of household’s


































tkt − et = (qv
t + dt)Vt−1
so we can deﬁne non-human wealth as,
Wt = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + (Ptpk
t + 1 − δ)kt
3.4 Capital and Labour Demand: Cost Minimization
The optimal combination of capital and labour employed in the production of ﬁnal








where kjt is the private capital employed by the ﬁrm, ljt is the labour employed by
the ﬁrm, Al
t is labour embodied technical progress and k
p
t is the public stock of capital
accumulated by the government. We assume that this production function exhibits
14constrant returns to scale in its arguments, so that the ﬁrm faces diminishing returns
in its private factors. Accordingly, we can experience exogenous growth through the
exogenous growth of labour-embodied technical progress, ω such that Al
t+1 = ωAl
t.

































wt is the real wage and pk
t the rental cost of capital. Since all ﬁrms are identical, these






































3.5 Price Setting of Final Goods Firms









where π∗ is the steady-state inﬂation rate. The problem facing ﬁrm j is to maximise















where given the demand curve, yt(j) = (pt(j)/Pt)
−ε yt , nominal proﬁts are deﬁned as,




















15So that, in a symmetric equilibrium where pt(j) = Pt, the ﬁrst order conditions are
given by,

















which is the Rotemberg version of the Phillips curve relationship. Equilibrium real
proﬁts of all ﬁnal goods producers are then given as,
￿ 1
0














That completes our derivation of the model, which is summarised in Appendix 1.
4 Social Welfare
Deﬁning what is optimal in an OLG model involves deciding how to compare diﬀerent
generations. Since we are interested in formulating optimal policy for our economy
populated with overlapping generations of ﬁnitely lived consumers we must face the
tricky issue of constructing a welfare metric. Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) deﬁne the
























t) is the utility at time t of a household
born at time s. The ﬁrst summation is the utility of representative agents of generations
yet to be born, discounted at the policy-maker’s discount factor, ρ. The second is the
expected utility of households currently alive. These utilities are discounted back to the
birthdate of the currently living generations, rather than the current period. Calvo and
Obstfeld (1988) note that this is necessary to avoid the time inconsistency in preferences
that would otherwise emerge by treating generations asymmetrically. In other words,
if the policy maker did not discount utilities back to birthdates, then he would wish
to change the consumption plans he put in place for currently unborn generations the
moment they are born.













so that the instantaneous ﬂow utility to the policy maker is given by the summation
over generations of their instantaneous utility discounted by the private discount factor
and adjusted by the public discount factor. These are then discounted over time using













which allows us to decompose the policy-maker’s problem into two parts. The ﬁrst part
involves the policy maker’s optimal allocation of consumption and labour supply across
households. The second relates to the intertemporal aspects of the problem. Since we
are only interested in the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal adjustment in an environment
where government debt can potentially crowd-out private capital, we abstract from the
intratemporal intergenerational problem and focus on the intertemporal problem, such








t + κln(1 − lt)] (53)
where we assume that ρ = β such that the policy maker discounts the future at the
same rate as households, but without accounting for the probability of death. In solving
its intertemporal problem the policy maker ignores the distribution of variables across
generations at a given point in time by focusing on per capita variables.5
An additional complication we need to consider is that our model is non-stationary
due to the exogenous increase in labour-embodied technical progress. Due to the fact














s=0 ln(ω)+ϕln(1 − lt). This implies
we can obtain an exact expression for discounted lifetime welfare,
Wt = βEtWt+1 + lnAl








ln(ω) + ϕln(1 − lt)
5It should be noted that allowing the government to implement a (lump-sum) intratemporal redistrib-
ution scheme to maximise social welfare would eﬀectively oﬀset the diﬀerential tax treatment of diﬀerent
generations that the perpetual youth model relies on to break from Ricardian Equivalence. While al-
lowing aggregate policy to consider distributional issues when implementing macro policy would require
us to track the distribution of ﬁnancial wealth across generations which is generally intractable due to
the impact of birth of new generations on that distribution.
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where yt and ut are vectors of the model’s endogenous and exogenous variables, respec-
tively, U(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut) = lnct+χln Mt
Pt +ϑlngc
t+κln(1−lt)+tip, where tip refers to
terms in the productivity growth which are independent of policy, f(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut) =
0 are the model’s equilibrium conditions, and λt is a vector of Lagrange multipliers as-
sociated with these constraints.

















where F is the lead operator, such that F−1 is a one-period lag. We can then solve these
ﬁrst order conditions in combination with the non-linear equilibrium conditions of the
model, f(ys+1,ys,ys−1,us) = 0. We do this fully non-linearly to obtain the steady-state
of the policy makers problem. Since this is a perfect foresight economy, we can also solve
for the non-linear transition dynamics using standard techniques, and we discuss those
dynamic paths below.
In exploring optimal policy, we also consider the allocation that would be achieved
by a social planner who simply implemented the ﬁrst-best solution. The social planner’s




βt[ln￿ ct + ϑln￿ gt + κ ln(1 − lt)] + tip (55)
subject to,











t+1 = ￿ e
p
t + (1 − δ)￿ k
p
t (58)
￿ yt = ￿ ct + ￿ gt + ￿ et + ￿ e
p
t (59)
Note that government debt does not exist in the social planner’s problem, so the con-
straints involved in inheriting a positive debt level disappear. Deriving the focs and
eliminating the associated lagrange multipliers gives us the optimal relationship between
18government spending and consumption,
￿ gt = ϑ￿ ct (60)








the intertemporal consumption/saving decision is given by,
ω￿ c−1
t = β￿ c−1




while the balance between public and private forms of capital is given by,
α1￿ k
p
t = α3￿ kt (63)
Simultaneously solving equations (56)-(63) then yields the social planner’s allocation.
4.2 Calibration
In order to analyse the main implications of our model, we ﬁrst calibrate our model
based on empirically observed levels of real GDP growth, public and private capital,
government consumption, labour income shares and government debt in the US. Between
1980 and 2008, the average annualised growth rate was 2.88%, private and public capital
to GDP ratios were 2.3 and 0.6 respectively, government consumption was 16% of GDP,
the labour income share was around 54% and government debt averaged 55.6% percent
of GDP. Table 1 summarises the values of the calibrated baseline parameters, and Table
2 summarises the resultant steady-state..
The elasticity of demand with respect to price (ε) is set to 11, consistent with a
steady-state mark-up, ε/(ε − 1), equal to 1.1. The price adjustment cost parameter of
φ = 100 is standard and is set to ensure the log-linearised NKPC matches that obtained
under Calvo (1983) pricing with empirically estimated contract duration probabilities
such as those in Leith and Malley (2006). We assume a steady-state annualised inﬂation
rate of 2%. Parameter κ, measuring the weight on leisure in utility, was set to 1.14,
which is generally consistent with households allocating about a third of their time
to market activities. While the weight given to government consumption in utility,
ϑ = 0.24, implies that the policy maker would ensure that government consumption as
a share of private consumption is similar to the patterns found in the US data.With
a quarterly discount factor (β) of 0.9938, and a survival probability of γ = 0.995,
implying an expected adult working life of 50 years6 our model can match these steady-
6We focus on economically active individuals (from 15 to 64 years old). 50 years is then a com-
promise between the years that Europeans are active, which is the reference variable for labour, and
19β γ χ ϑ κ α1 α2 δ ε φ A
0.9938 0.995 0 0.24 1.14 0.59 0.34 0.021 11.0 100 1
Table 1: Calibration of baseline model - Parameters
b/y ω g/y k/y kp/y wN/y π r τ
55.6% 2.88% 0.16 2.27 0.64 0.54 2% 5.44% 0.45
Table 2: Calibration of baseline model - Initial Steady State
state ratios with an elasticity of output with respect to labour and private capital of
α1 = 0.59 and α2 = 0.34, respectively. This, in turns implies a coeﬃcient on public
capital in production of 0.07 which is slightly above the 0.05 adopted in Baxter and
King (200X), but well within the range of estimates considered in the meta-analysis of
Bom and Ligthart (2009). Finally, since seignoriage revenues play no signiﬁcant role in
debt stabilization, we assume that the economy approaches its cashless limit, χ → 0.
The depreciation rate (δ) is equal to 0.021, as estimated by Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992).
It should be noted that this calibration is not based on the steady-state of the
Ramsey problem, but the steady-state of the structural model equations given the levels
of government consumption, investment and taxes needed to support observed levels of
government spending, public capital and government debt as a proportion of gdp, as well
as labour income shares, growth rates and private capital/output ratios. We shall see
that when these variables, in conjunction with monetary policy, are chosen optimally
the economy will move a long way from this starting point. For these reason we do
not employ any approximation techniques in solving the model, such that steady-state
solutions and dynamics of the model are all obtained as fully non-linear solutions to the
Ramsey policy problem described above.
4.3 The Optimal Debt Target
In this section we examine the optimal level of steady state government assets implied
by the simpliﬁed version of our model, using the calibration set out above. This solution
is obtained by solving the non-linear equations of the model together with the ﬁrst order
conditions (54). In the steady-state solution the policy maker achieves their inﬂation
target of 2%, so that in terms of the steady-state solution to the Ramsey problem it
is as if this is a ‘real’ model, where the only distortions are monopolistic competition
and income taxes, which are the only taxes available to the government. However, when
life expectancy which is probably a more relevant variable for consumption. We also set “economic”
life expectancy equal to 50 years as a way of having a lower discount rate and, therefore, higher non-
Ricardian eﬀects. Nevertheless, in sensitivity analysis, we also consider the consequences of having a
lower probability of death.
20we consider the dynamics of the solution to the Ramsey problem, we shall see that
monetary policy has a signiﬁcant role to play in the short-run.
Before exploring folly optimal policy, we consider ﬁrst the steady state associated
with zero government assets/debt. Essentially, policy is optimal in the case, except that
we replace the foc for government debt with a target of zero debt. Government spending
continues to be set at its optimal level, conditional on zero debt. This is the third column
in Table 3 labelled ‘Zero Debt’. Here we can see that there is a slight increase in the ratio
of private capital to output as a result of the reduction in government debt, but a quite
dramatic fall in the ratio of public capital to output from the 0.64 found in the data
to 0.37. Public consumption is a bit over a quarter of the level of private consumption,
and tax rates have fallen to 31% encouraging time spent in work to rise from 0.34 to
0.36. The welfare implications of such a policy are that steady-state welfare is 16%
lower than that achieved by the social planner, which is a signiﬁcant improvement on
the 63% reduction in welfare relative to the Social Planer’s allocation implied by the
initial, unoptimised, steady-state. .
Variable Calibration Zero Debt mc = 1 +Lump Sum Optimal Lump Sum +mc = 1 Soc. Planner
b/y 0.56 0 0 0 -2.84 -11.80 —2.90 n.a.
k/y 2.27 2.29 2.51 2.51 2.36 2.65 2.60 2.60
kp/y 0.64 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39
r 5.44% 5.85% 5.89% 5.89% 5.36% 3.83% 5.40% n.a.
c/y 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.54 0.54
g/y 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
τ 0.45 0.31 0.29 n.a. 0.19 n.a. n.a. n.a.
h 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.49
Welfare 63% 16% 7% 1% 9% 3% 0 n.a.
Table 3: Steady State of Ramsey Problem
The next two columns look at the impact of the two steady-state distortions on the
model, if government debt remains zero. Removing the monopoly distortion raises the
level of all variables, although the impact on private capital is greatest. If we in addition
allow lump sum taxes, so that the income tax rate is zero, then we substitute labour
for capital, and as a result there is a substantial increase in the real interest rate and a
massive increase in labour supply to 0.49. However private capital is still sub-optimally
low in this economy and welfare falls only 1% short of the level achieved by the social
planner. The reasons for this shortfall can be seen by comparing these numbers with
the ﬁnal column of the table, which gives the allocation that would be chosen by a social
planner who ﬁxed physical capital investment, output, consumption and labour supply
only constrained by technology and the resource constraint.
21The sixth column, labelled ‘Optimal’, restores both distortions, but sets government
assets to their optimal level, assuming a discount rate equal to the rate of time preference.
As expected, the optimal steady state debt target is negative. In fact, it is optimal
for government assets to exceed the level of the capital stock, so that agents are net
creditors. A direct implication (see equation (10)), is that the steady state real interest
rate is slightly below the rate of time preference (after adjusting for growth). (The level
of annualised real interest rates that would equate the two in the presence of steady-
state growth of 2.88% is approximately 5.47%). Compared to the case where debt was
zero, output is over 14% higher. Relative to this higher level of output, government
consumption has risen to 13% of GDP, as the interest from government assets pays for a
good proportion of this expenditure. The income tax rate has fallen from its calibrated
rate of 45% to only 19%. However the fact that the income tax rate remains positive,
implies that we are clearly well below the zero tax level of government assets.
This last ﬁnding enables us to interpret our results in terms of the analysis in section
2. We noted that if the real interest rate in steady state was below the rate of time
preference, then it was possible that A∗ < AK < AT. From the above we can see that
A∗ < AT, although AK is unobservable. However, if A∗ > AK (government assets were
greater than that required to achieve the optimum level of capital), then this would
not be a steady state, because there would be an incentive to cut taxes and raise debt
because the real interest rate was below the discount rate. We could observe AK directly
by eliminating distortionary taxes. This is done partially in the next column. The
optimal level of government assets rises substantially, with a more moderate increase in
capital, output and consumption. This clearly illustrates that AK is greater than the
A∗ in the previous column. The steady-state of this ‘optimal’ policy falls 9% short of
the levels of welfare enjoyed under the social planner’s allocation. Allowing taxes to be
lump-sum (column 7) leads to a massive increase in the steady-state level of government
ﬁnancial assets as tax smoothing ceases to be an issue, a dramatic reduction in the real
interest rate and an overaccumulation of private sector capital. In this case, welfare is
only 3% less than that attained by the social planner. While if we were to eliminate the
monopolistic competition distortion as well, a policy maker with access to lump-sum
taxes could achieve the social planner’s allocation.
We noted in section 2 that the arguments for discounting the utility of future gener-
ations by the rate of time preference were not compelling. If we discounted utility at a
lower rate, then clearly the optimal level of government assets would rise. In the most
extreme case, where no discounting took place, the optimal level of capital would be
the golden rule level that maximised steady state consumption. In this model, without
discounting by the policy maker, the real interest rate would simply reﬂect technical
progress. Whether this could be achieved with a suﬃciently large level of government
assets is unclear, but experiments with the model suggest that values of government
assets in excess of 12 times the level of GDP continue to produce a positive real interest
22rate in excess of the rate of technical progress. In that sense, the levels of A∗ presented
in Table 3, although historically unprecedented, are not the upper bound of what might
be socially optimal in an OLG economy.
We now undertake a sensitivity analysis of the optimal steady-state debt-gdp ratio
as we vary the producitivity growth rate and the productivity of public capital, respec-
tively. Figure 1 plots the steady-state debt-gdp ratio as a function of the annualised
productivity growth rate. There is a strong dependence of the desired debt-gdp ratio
on the growth rate, where a lower rate of productivity growth would substantially raise
the desired stock of government assets. This is essentially driven by the fact that higher
anticipated productivity growth reduces the socially optimal degree of capital accumu-
lation such that there is less need to accumulate government assets in an attempt to
crowd-in private investment. The desired stock of steady-state government assets also
depends on the productivity of public capital - see Figure 2. The intuition is straight-
forward - as the productivity of public capital rises, relative to private capital there
is less need for the government to attempt to reduce public debt in order to crowd in
private-sector investment as public-sector investment is increasingly eﬀective in raising
output levels. We shall consider the impact of changing the probability of death on both
the transition and steady-state below.
4.4 Transition paths
In this section we present a brief analysis of the optimal transition path to this steady
state, using a simulation of the full non-linear Ramsey policy. Our simulation begins
at the calibrated steady-state which features public and private capital to GDP ratios
of 0.64 and 2.27, respectively, alongside a debt to gdp ratio of 0.56. Starting from
that initial position, the Ramsey policy will move us towards the steady-state labelled
‘optimal’ in Table 3, where the long-run capital to GDP ratios for public and private
capital are, 0.39 and 2.37 and the government debt to GDP ratio has fallen to -2.84.
We break the transition between this initial state to the Ramsey steady-state into two
stages. The ﬁrst year impact of adopting optimal monetary and ﬁscal policies is shown
in Figures 3 and 4, where the solid line details the paths followed by key variables in the
initial year of the optimal policy. The most striking aspect of the early response to the
switch to optimal policy is that it is desirable to underetake a very large privatisation
programme, eﬀectively transferring public capital to the private sector to the extent that
the public capital to GDP ratio actually falls below its long-run value despite starting
well above such a position.7 In otherwords, although the initial ratio of public capital to
gdp is well above the optimal long-run ratio, in the transition there is an overshooting
7Strictly speaking since we have single aggregate good in this economy which can be costlessly
converted to and from use in consumption or either type of capital, this ‘privatisation’ does not involved
a direct transfer of capital goods from the public to private sector. Nevertheless, the simultaneous
reduction in public capital and increase in private capital mimics just such a transfer.
23in the sell-oﬀ of public capital, and in the medium term public capital needs to be re-
accumulated to achieve its long-run optimum. The proceeds of selling oﬀ public capital
in this way give rise to a signiﬁcant initial fall in government debt. There is also a mild
initial rise in inﬂation, as policy makers take advantage of the fact that expectations are
given in the initial period of the new optimal policy by raising inﬂation without fueling
future inﬂation expectations and thereby slightly erode the real value of government
debt. However, it is the eﬀects of the selling public assets that have the biggest impact
on initial debt dynamics.
Beyond the eﬀects of the privatisation of public assets, the remainder of the ﬁscal
adjustment is far smoother and is reported in Figures 5 and 6. which show that dynamic
adjustment is very drawn out over time. Although a signiﬁcant part of the debt reduction
is achieved very quickly by selling public capital, it takes over 100 years to achieve the
ﬁrst 50% of the adjustment and complete adjustment takes around 500 years. This
very long adjustment period is not surprising for two reasons. First, while complete
tax smoothing no longer applies, the Blanchard-Yaari framework with realistic values
for the probability of death gives only quantitatively minor deviations from Ricardian
Equivalence, and so a large smoothing element is retained. Second, earlier analysis using
models of this type suggest very long drawn out dynamics (e.g. Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2000)). The result that debt adjustment should be very slow appears fairly robust (see
Marcet and Scott (2008) for example).
The reduction in debt is achieved by above steady-state tax revenues, a short-run
de-accumulation of public capital and cuts in government consumption. However, even-
tually once the debt has fallen suﬃciently, tax rates fall and public investment and con-
sumption can rise above current levels. Consumption declines for several years, which
clearly shows why moving to the optimal level of debt is not a Pareto improvement. The
current generation will be worse oﬀ as a result of raising the level of government assets.
Most of the adjustment in debt is achieved through ﬁscal variables, and monetary policy
generally succeeds in ensuring minimal deviations from its inﬂation target throughout
the transition. .
Although the speed of adjustment is very slow, the size of adjustment required from
current levels of debt is also very large. As a result, the implications for debt reduction
for debt reduction today will still be signiﬁcant. We should also note, however, that are
starting point for adjustment does not involve interest rates at the zero lower bound
and a large recession, so our analysis has no immediate implications for the current
‘stimulus versus austerity’ debate. However, we can contrast the transition paths for
identical economies starting from diﬀerent initial levels of public debt. Here we can see
that all the economy will tend to the same steady-state level of government assets in
the long-run, any initial shock to government debt will only be eliminated very slowly,
with clear diﬀerences across the transition paths for at least 150 years. This implies
that even although it may be optimal to substantially reduce government debt in the
24long-run, the fact that the recent ﬁnancial crisis has raised government debt levels does
not imply that that ﬁscal correction need be noticeably more rapid.
The dashed green line in the same Figures consider the transition path starting from
a position where government debt is signiﬁcantly higher. Here the privatisation pro-
gramme is even more extensive, even although public capital will be built up again in
the long-run. Additionally, the high debt stock tempts the policy maker to engineer
a one-oﬀ suprise burst of inﬂation, such that inﬂation rises to an annualised rate of
almost 40% upon adoption of the optimal policy, although the policy maker quickly
returns inﬂation to target in subsequent periods. This application of surprise inﬂation
in the initial period arises since we allowed the policy maker to exploit the fact that
inﬂationary expectations are given prior to unexpectedly implementing optimal policy.
It is interesting to note that this burst of inﬂation is achieved through a combination
of loose monetary policy and an increase in distortionary tax rates, which is also inﬂa-
tionary. The fact that the policy maker is prepared to implement such a large rate of
inﬂation demonstrates just how signiﬁcant the time-inconsistency problems inherent in
the optimal Ramsey policy must be (see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) for an exploration
of the implications of not being able to commit to the optimal policy in the context of
an inﬁnite horizon New Keynesian economy). Beyond those initial attempts to reduce
the debt burden the subsequent reduction in government debt remains gradual, alhough
it is clearly more aggressive when debt levels are particularly large However it remains
the case that it takes over 100 years to achieve half the desired reduction in the debt to
gdp ratio and 500 years to achieve the full adjustment.
The absence of the random walk result stems from the fact that in our OLG economy
interest rates typically deviate from consumers’ rate of time preference since government
debt constitutes an element of net worth. We assess the importance of the absence of
Ricardian Equivalence by decreasing the expected working life from 50 years to 25 years
and then 12.5 years in Figures 7-10.8 Looking at the dynamic paths for debt in Figure 7
we can see that this has little impact on the ultimate long-run level of government assets,
but signiﬁcantly aﬀects the speed of ﬁscal stabilisation. With the shortened household
planning horizon of 12.5 years the debt stock turns negative almost instantly, thanks
to the aggressive sell-oﬀ of public sector assets and deﬂation of the real value of debt
due to an initial surprise inﬂation resulting from a relaxation of monetary policy and a
sharp rise in distortionary taxation. Essentially, the policy maker acts quickly to oﬀset
the costly crowding out induced by the high levels of interest rates associated with high
levels of government debt when the deviation from Ricardian equivalence is large.
Finally, we consider the robustness of these results to variations in other key pa-
rameters. Figure 11 plots the transition paths for government debt under the optimal
policy for various changes in model parameters. In all subplots the benchmark calibra-
tion implies an optimal transition path given by the solid red line. In the ﬁrst subplot,
8This is done by reducing the quarterly survival probability from 0.995 to 0.99 and then 0.98.
25we then increase the markup from 10% to 12.% (green dashed line) and from there to
16.7% (blue dot-dashed line). This aﬀects the level of output produced, cet. par. and
so aﬀects the initial debt-gdp ratio although the level of debt is held constant across
simulations. Nevertheless the diﬀerences are small and ultimately a greater degree of
imperfect competition results in a slightly higher level of debt-gdp largely reﬂecting the
reduced level of output rather than any desire to increase the level of government bor-
rowing. The next subplot varies the weight attached to government spending in utility
from the benchmark to 0.3 (green dashed line) to 0.4 (blue dot-dashed line). As the
weight attached to government consumption is increased there is some desire to increase
the debt to gdp ratio relative to the becnhmark optimum, again reﬂecting the lower level
of output implied by this reparameterisation. The third subplot, increases the weight
on leisure in utility, from the benchmark to 1.2 (green dashed line) to 1.4 (blue dot-
dashed line). This has a very small impact on the transition and ultimate steady-state,
although again there is a tendency to have a slightly higher debt-to-gdp ratio as worker
eﬀort is reduced, reﬂecting the reduced output levels this implies. Finally, we vary the
degree of price stickiness from the Rotemberg adjustment cost of 100 to 75 and then 50.
This has a negligible impact on both transition dynamics and the optimal steady-state.
Therefore, across all these variants of model parameterisation the optimal speed of ﬁscal
correction and its ultimate accumulation of a large amount of ﬁnancial wealth on the
part of the government remain unchanged.
5 Conclusions
In models without default where agents are eﬀectively inﬁnitely lived, there is no opti-
mal debt target because the costs of reducing debt are always higher than the cost of
accommodating the existing level of debt. In OLG models this is no longer true for two
reasons. First, the real rate of interest is likely to be above the rate of time preference,
so the beneﬁts of future reductions in debt now outweigh the current costs of achiev-
ing lower debt. Second, the level of the capital stock is likely to be below the socially
optimal level, and reductions in debt will crowd in capital.
In this paper we examine the optimal level of debt in one particular OLG model, the
model of perpetual youth. We show that the optimal debt target in a calibrated version
of this model involves positive government assets (i.e. a negative debt target), but these
assets are below both the level required to eliminate distortionary taxes, and the level
required to achieve the optimum capital stock. This is because, when the economy is
distorted by monopolistic competition and income taxes, as debt declines the real rate
of interest falls below the rate of time preference before the economy reaches the optimal
capital stock. The optimal transition path towards this steady state is very drawn out,
involving hundreds of years, but as the steady state involves historically unprecedented
levels of government assets, the implications for debt adjustment in the short term may
26still be quantitatively signiﬁcant.
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30A Appendix — Summary of Aggregate Model





where all variables are now in per capita terms.



















t + 1 − δ)kt (66)
where mt ≡ Mt/Pt and bt ≡ Bt/Pt, and the aggregate human wealth is










The government budget constraint is given by
gt + i
p
t + st = τw
t wtlt + bt −
Rt−1
πt




The deﬁnition of proﬁts (in real terms)
￿ 1
0
 jtdj = yt
￿






Combine the households’ aggregate resource constraint with the government budget
constraint and the deﬁnition of proﬁts to obtain the aggregate resource constraint
gt + i
p
















The equation of motion of the private and public capital stocks are given by,





t + (1 − δ)k
p
t (73)






t+1 + 1 − δ
￿
(74)
Inﬂation is described by,

























































With an exogenous growth rate in labour-embodied technical progress of ω such that
Al
t+1 = ωAl
t, we can render the equilibrium stationary by deﬂating the following variables
{yt,mt,ct
Wt
Pt ,kt,et,bt,Dt} by the level of labour-embodied technical progress..
The aggregate demand for money is given by,
























￿ bt−1 + (pk
t + 1 − δ)￿ kt (80)
where mt ≡ Mt/Pt and bt ≡ Bt/Pt, and the aggregate human wealth is





￿ Ht ≡ (1 − τw
t )￿ wtlt +
￿ 1
0
￿  jtdj (82)
32The government budget constraint is given by,
￿ gt +￿ i
p
t = τw
t ￿ wtlt +￿ bt −
Rt−1
ωt−1πt




The deﬁnition of proﬁts (in real terms)
￿ 1
0
￿  jtdj = ￿ yt
￿






Combine the households’ aggregate resource constraint with the government budget
constraint and the deﬁnition of proﬁts to obtain the aggregate resource constraint
￿ gt +￿ i
p















= κ￿ ct (85)
The equation of motion of the private and public capital stocks is given by,





t + (1 − δ)￿ k
p
t (87)







t+1 + (1 − δ)
￿
(88)
Inﬂation is described by,


















































and the production function,































































































































Figure 1: Ramsey Steady-State and the Rate of Growth
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Figure 2: Ramsey Steady-State and Public Capital
35Notes to Dynamics Figures 3—6: Solid red line - initial debt of 54% of gdp, dashed
blue line - initial debt of 110%, dotted green line - initial debt of 160%.








































































































































































































Figure 3: Ramsey Dynamics in the First Year I






















































































































Figure 4: Ramsey Dynamics in the First Year II




































































































































































































Figure 5: Ramsey Dynamics Beyond the First Year I
























































































































Figure 6: Ramsey Dynamics Beyond the First Year II
Notes to Figures 7-10: Expected Lifetime of 12.5 years - green dotted line, 25 years
- blue dashed line and 50 years - red solid line.








































































































































































































Figure 7: Ramsey Dynamics and Non-Ricardian Consumers I

























































































































Figure 8: Ramsey Dynamics and Non-Ricardian Consumers II












































































































































































































Figure 9: Ramsey Dynamics and Non-Ricardian Consumers - First Year I






















































































































Figure 10: Ramsey Dynamics and Non-Ricardian Consumers - First Year II





















































Varying the Weight of G in Utility


























Varying the Weight of Leisure in Utility



























Figure 11: Robustness of Optimal Policy Across Alternative Parameterisations
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